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RESUME : Les défenseurs de l’euthanasie 
prônent le « droit à mourir dans la dignité » 
et récemment avec les pressions  de la vie en 
société revendiquent « le devoir de mourir ». 
Cet article essaie d’analyser le lien entre 
l’euthanasie et le suicide. 
Mots clés: Euthanasie, approche, suicide, 
bioéthique 
ABSTRACT: Advocates of euthanasia 
advocate the "right to die with dignity" and 
recently with the pressures of life in society 
claim "the duty to die". This article tries to 
analyze the link between euthanasia and 
suicide. 








In the treatment accorded to euthanasia in our times, whether 
as an inalienable right of an independent modern subject or, 
in a peculiar paradox, as a right that cannot be denied to a 
subject who is no longer independent and that may be 
exercised precisely due to the subject’s loss of independence, 
two opposing discourses have generally arisen.  
 




euthanasia to a form of 
suicide philosophically 
defined as the act 
characteristic of such 
independence, and which constitutes its 
principal content; it has been defined as the 
right to a dignified death. This right was 
created on the 





the 1920s and 
1930s lost its 
pre-eminence. 
In Hoche and 
Binding’s work, for example, as many pages 
were devoted to eugenics as to extolling 
dying with dignity (Schank K, 1922 ; 
Sarment, 2002). This new right diverges, in 
Euthanasia and complacency in bioethics: an 
approach based on suicide.  
Revue Africaine de Bioéthique et d’Ethique Médicale, Numero 2, Vol.1 - Décembre 2017 
 
37 
a sense, from the preeminent position of 
suicide in postmodernity. Here, then, suicide 
does not restore dignity in the classical sense 
that a good death justifies an entire life, but 
rather appears as the end to an unjustified 
life. In the nihilistic approach, and despite 
Cioran (Cioran E, 1995) affirming with a 
certain irony that none commit suicide more 
frequently than lapsed optimists, suicide 
appears as a form of inevitable destiny, a 
way in which one exercises a freedom 
without meaning, an exit. The Columbian 
thinker Nicolás Gómez Dávila (1977) 
remarked with heavy sarcasm that he did not 
believe in the honesty of a genuinely modern 
(one may read postmodern) man who had 
not committed suicide.  
In opposition to this claimed right to a 
“dignified death”, rather than to a nihilistic 
sui- cide, there is generally a religious 
argument, with all the negative conno- 
tations that religious limits face in our age, 
characterised by so-called “bars to further 
inquiry”. This argument is always 
constructed as clearly prejudicial, a limiting, 
irrational prejudice that conceals some will 
to dominate or some atavistic 
unreasonableness. It is clear that prejudice 
has a poor reputation in our era, in contrast 
to the archaic aphorism the same author 
mentioned above: “prejudices protect us 
from idiotic ideas”. To be clear, I do not 
seek to enter here into a defence of prejudice, 
but instead to observe certain of its social 
functions.  
However, attention is not always paid to the 
fact that so-called prejudice is not 
necessarily religious in the sense that it 
necessarily depends on the prohibition upon 
taking a life that belongs to a jealous God-
Father. On the contrary, prejudice appears in 
the varied de- finitions of the order, as 
Voegelin might say, with greatly varied 
justifications. Certainly, Plato and Socrates 
analyse the inability to dispose of one’s own 
life on the basis that it does not belong to us. 
But we may insist that this lack of full 
ownership has a multitude of explanations. 
We might argue that the prejudice is 
sufficient- ly interreligious that we could 
glean from it an essentially generalized 
social conditioning opposing the “free” 
elimination of one’s own life when it is so 
desired or when one simply fears an ill. In 
principle, disposing of one’s own life has 
suffered from a negative reputation and has 
given rise to mistrust, as is amply shown by 
the religious rituals that aggravated the 
treatment dispensed to those committing 
violence upon themselves in comparison 
with those committing violence against 
others. On this point, burial rituals have been 
particularly rigorous. But it is no surprise to 
observe that social conditioning also reigns 
in creating an obligation in the opposite 
sense, in reclaiming suicide as a mandatory 
act, that is, when custom indicates that in 
certain cases what the subject will be bound 
to do is precisely to kill themsel- ves, or at 
least that the preferred social model is that of 
one who commits suicide, or if one prefers, 
that the act of suicide is understood, praised 
and lauded.  
The second discourse would oppose 
euthanasia. It is the approach I have 
supported in the works I have published on 
the issue, including in “Euthanasia and 
dependent life” (Ruiz-Calderon S, 2001) 
This discourse includes those of us who 
prefer to analyse euthanasia from the 
perspective of a transitive act (that is, an act 
that one does not perform upon oneself but 
rather that one subject performs upon 
another), carried out by a doctor, by way of 
which a particular society deems it 
appropriate to kill patients with certain 
characteristics, among which the subject’s 
will to die is of course sometimes 
highlighted, with the subject receiving death 
as a benefit. Along these lines, we have 
often referred to what John Keown and 
Revue Africaine de Bioéthique et d’Ethique Médicale, Numero 2, Vol.1 - Décembre 2017 
 
38 
Etienne Montero have called the logical 
slippery slope or, if one prefers, to the 
defining feature of euthanasia being the 
objec- tive conditions upon which it depends, 
rather than voluntariness (Keown J, 2002).  
Without altering the position adopted in my 
previous writing on the matter, I believe that 
in the study, more than in the debate on 
euthanasia, in order to be honest we must 
transcend these camps and seek to 
understand the reasons and, in no few 
instances, the masks that explain the various 
attitudes. First, we are aware that our 
opinions do not necessarily interest anybody. 
It is also doubtful that the debate as it exists 
today in academia would be particularly 
effec- tive in building social majorities. For 
majorities, the rationality of arguments is 
often irrelevant, bound as they are to certain 
ideological pre- judices. Put differently, 
recognizing that the illusion of having a 
decisive influence through academic debate 
is vain may result in avoiding its greatest 
risk; that is, falling into apologetics.  
However, this observation should not lead us 
to passivity in the sense of renouncing the 
personal lucidity arising out of a taste for 
lear- ning. In this regard, the note that I 
present today is above all an attempt at 
clarifying the link between suicide and 
euthanasia, a link of social and normative 
transcendence, in which I naturally believe 
that suicide has a social as- pect generally 
ignored by those who make the leap from an 
essentially personal explanation that is, 
suicide as inevitable consequence of self-
determination- to the appraisal of suicide as 
explicable on a medical basis.  
Today I shall commence from premises that 
differ somewhat from the grounds on which 
euthanasia has been approached on previous 
occasions. First of all, without dismissing 
the pathological nature of a high number of 
sui- cides, I have my doubts that this kind of 
ap- proach to death by one’s own hand may 
not be a fundamentally ideological example 
of what has been called the medicalization of 
suicide. It is the case that a few short years 
ago, in the Spanish Senate’s Committee on 
Euthanasia, the argument was made that 95 
per cent of suicides were due to pathological 
causes. Yet this description is too dependent 
on the tendency to treat both attempted and 
successful suicides in a psychiatric fashion. 
In describing death by one’s own hand in 
this way, as a symptom of a pathology, it 
would appear that we are constantly 
participating in a kind of begging the 
question, in establishing the link that defines 
the approach to this act in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. However, it is not 
difficult to observe that classical suicide, 
habitually described from a cultural or 
humanist standpoint, has probably been 
behind and formed the basis of arguments 
regarding dignified death through euthanasia 
in contemporary societies that are at least as 
ideological as the psychiatric approach that 
we have criticized. Not all suicides will be 
nihilistic such as that of the daughter of the 
Russian official who commits suicide in 
Paris as described by Dostoyevsky, or the 
counterpoint of the hopeless adolescent who 
kills herself in Saint Petersburg, pregnant, 
clutching an icon, but nor, of course, do they 
appear significant or particularly descriptive 
of the reality of attempts, successful or 
otherwise, to imitate the death of Socrates 
(Doctoievski F, 1876). 
Second, I find growing difficulties in the 
truism regarding the anti-natural character of 
suicide from a natural law perspective. In a 
certain sense, wishing for death appears to 
be a very common fact in humans, which 
must of course overcome certain instinctive 
resistance. This resistance, however, can be 
quelled: not only by panic, a circumstance 
shared with ani- mals, but also by the impact 
of the imagination. The power of the 
imagined or suffered ill, its immediate 
Revue Africaine de Bioéthique et d’Ethique Médicale, Numero 2, Vol.1 - Décembre 2017 
 
39 
presence in human nature, provides a highly 
direct explanation of the death wish and the 
decision to bring death upon oneself. But for 
precisely this reason, there appears to be a 
certain frivolity in the naturalization of 
suicide or in its conversion into a more or 
less normalized act. It cannot be forgotten 
that in many of our countries, suicide is the 
commonest form of violent death, exceeding, 
for example, traffic accidents, and with the 
not inconside- rable peculiarity that suicide 
is probably the form of violent death that is 
most hidden, to counter the effects of 
contagion and due to its social stigma. Nor 
can we disregard its irreversible character. I 
admit that all acts are in some sense 
irreversible, it not being possible for us to 
prevent their having appeared in the world 
through mere desire. But the irreversibility 
of death, except in the case of extraordinary 
re- surrection, has a radical quality for us.  
I wish to state that analysing euthanasia as a 
derivative of suicide does not merely require 
a focus on the most obvious differences, the 
first being that in euthanasia the subject 
would lack full autonomy to request 
assistance in the form of death or would 
receive it as a medical act, an aspect we have 
identified on other oc- casions. Rather, we 
must consider two defining elements. One is 
the constant presence of suicide as a 
temptation for the human subject. This has 
appeared across all stories since Antiquity, 
but has become a key topic in modern and 
postmodern literature. The other is the social 
nature of suicide, even when seeking to 
approach it from the most autonomous 
perspective of subjects isolated from 
themselves and even, if one wishes, from 
God. What I seek to argue is that one cannot 
ignore the social opinion of suicide, which is 
always present in all cases and across all 
eras in the rules that govern the sacred, 
custom or the most strictly legal (on the 
basis, naturally, that at many cultural 
moments there is no distinction among these 
ways of describing the order).  
In his outstanding work “Semper Dolens: A 
History of Suicide in the West”, Ramón 
Andrés (Gonzales-Cobo A, 2015) tells a 
story from Roman history that, in good 
measure, summarizes the position I seek to 
adopt in my text, focused this time on the 
relationship between euthanasia and suicide. 
We have avoided this relationship in the 
anti-euthanasia discourse, highly focused on 
medical ethics and on the transformation of 
the healthcare function within a society 
where killing becomes a permitted, or, 
perhaps, a mandatory act.  
To be frank, I must state that the author I am 
citing would probably disagree to a large 
extent with the conclusions that I shall take 
from the data he provides. However, the so- 
litude of the writer in establishing company 
with the solitude of the reader does carry 
these risks, risks that I also assume on 
making these statements regarding 
euthanasia.   
I trust that the reader will permit reference to 
be made to a classic example, taken from the 
aforementioned work by Ramón Andrés.  
The sexagenarii de ponte were the Romans 
who, on being denied the right to vote upon 
reaching sixty years of age, threw 
themselves into the Tiber due to the shame 
of having lost the power to exercise the most 
important po- litical rights. A symbol of the 
decay to which man is subjected in an on-
going process of loss of powers and hence 
possibilities, which becomes clear at a 
particular moment and in a sense provokes, 
if the pun may be permitted, a decisive leap. 
Since Antiquity there has been no shortage 
of those who would present this act as being 
of the highest dignity and we know that what 
is encouraged is praised. Two readings may 
undoubtedly be made: one of an 
extraordinary, almost unbelievable act of 
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heroism, and another of a more or less 
enforced act (Gonzales-Cobo A, 2015). 
However, a simplified or laudatory reading 
of the honour of the sexagenarii de ponte, as 
so often occurs in tales of voluntary actors or 
of altruists partly forced into suicidal acts 
such as the Japanese Kamikaze, may quickly 
be placed under suspicion. A tale regarding 
the origin of this custom reveals its 
mandatory or heavily regulated nature, 
almost as occurs in the famed tales of 
Spartan women. Without disregarding a 
certain assumption of dignitas, the cause 
may be more external and, if one wishes, 
utilitarian. As the same author notes, it 
appears that during the Gallic invasions of 
Rome and given the scarcity of food in the 
city, it was customary to throw the elderly 
off the bridges of the Tiber. Faced with a 
view of the inevitable fate that awaited them, 
a good number preferred to “voluntarily” 
throw themselves in, giving rise to the 
custom that has been so favourably reported.  
Projecting this example from the past upon 
our current civilization would suggest that 
we are free from the most acute risks. The 
welfare society should not be exposed to 
immediately utilitarian pressure in the search 
for food. Certainly the model of subjects 
who enjoy and do not suffer, or perhaps 
enjoy more than they suffer, could generate 
and has in fact given rise to a certain similar 
trend, though less “di- gnified” than the one 
we saw described in the first explanation of 
the leap into the Tiber. The society of leisure, 
in the lesser sense that the term has for us, 
may lead to an exit when one is no longer 
capable of enjoying leisure. But there are 
other possibilities to take into account.  
It is evident that, in general, we are not 
living in a society subject to the pressure to 
survive exerted by the Gauls on Rome or by 
the Romans on Numancia. However, if we 
accept that our community is governed by 
what has been denominated the performance 
principle, the appearance of “socially 
recommended” suicide is a real risk, and not 
a strange slippery slope argument used to 
deny the exercise of freedom by a subject 
who chooses an exit that is not necessarily 
pathological, as we shall see.  
Among many others, there is a classical tale 
that can illustrate for us this idea of socially 
recommended suicide as an example of 
where certain changes in perspective with 
respect to voluntary death or death “by one’s 
own hand” may lead us.  
One of the suicides that is most moralized, 
exalted and to an extent defining of a social 
rather than personal model, is that of the 
Roman Lucretia. We may recall that this 
example is found at the base not only of the 
canon of Roman women, but also in the 
idealized huma- nist reconstruction of 
authentic dignity. What is more, from the 
political point of view, Lucretia’s suicidal 
response to her rape results in the destruction 
of tyranny framed by the Tarquins and the 
commencement of aristocratic Roman 
freedom (Gonzales-Cobo A, 2015). Faced 
with her suicide, inspired in the scenes of the 
Trojan War and according to the magisterial 
description by Shakespeare, there is no other 
suitable response from her father and 
husband than the revolt that frees Rome 
(Shakespeare W, 1986).  
The rape and resulting suicide are hence 
linked to real Roman freedom. On the 
contrary, the most critical interpretation 
occurs at the end of the historical period, 
when Saint Augustine answers those who 
reproach Roman virgins that have not 
committed suicide in the wake of the 
barbaric mass rape committed upon the 
sacking of the city, as the much-lauded 
Lucretia would have done.  
In his defence of the behaviour of the 
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Christians in Rome, undoubtedly in 
application of the principle that life belongs 
to God but also with the conviction that a 
survivor of rape has done nothing deserving 
of moral reproach, Saint Augustine takes a 
decisive step3. Saint Augustine’s treatment is 
morally rigorous, though I fear that it had 
less of a social effect than its moral rigour 
merited. And this is not the moment to 
engage in a complex examination of the so-
called sense of honour, of which Spain has 
provided particularly harsh examples in the 
form of the “Calderonian honour” seen in 
the works of the Baroque writer Calderón de 
la Barca.  
In any case, Saint Augustine’s argument is a 
post acto liberation of the abused woman 
insofar as it frees her from moral obligation 
and, on this point, from the moral use, in its 
full sense of being related to “mores”, of 
suicide.  
At this point I am not addressing the case of 
a woman who prefers suicide to the brutality 
that awaits her, as happened in various 
nations from China to Russia and Germany 
during the Second World War; in this case, 
insurmoun- table fear or awareness of the 
brutality that may occur provides a clear 
explanation for the choice, without the need 
for other conditions. My focus, therefore, is 
on situations such as that of Lucretia; that is, 
on women who sur- vive and find 
themselves faced with a moral judgment that 
the appropriate conduct is to commit suicide, 
as has occurred on a mass level in 
Bangladesh, for example, and in other cases 
of the India-Pakistan conflict.  
The much-lauded suicide, far from offering 
liberation, carries with it an increased 
number of possibilities and opportunities to 
become a path that can only lead to death.  
                                                      
3 Agustin de Hipona, Civitas Dei, I, 22 
My point, then, is that there is an insuffi- 
ciently addressed risk in considering 
euthanasia as a form of suicide; a risk that 
impacts upon its supposed voluntariness 
even while it retains the formal 
characteristics of a voluntary act.  
Briefly summarizing, we can say that the 
legalization of euthanasia has faced the fol- 
lowing objections, among others:  
The most important is the impossibility of 
restricting cases to the limits of the will of 
the petitioner, recipient or beneficiary of the 
euthanasia. That is, the case of the so-called 
slippery slope. The evidence of the risk that 
the incidence of involuntary euthanasia may 
grow has been compiled in the countries 
where euthanasia has been legalized.  
From the logical standpoint, reference has 
also been made to a so-called logical 
slippery slope; that is, that since it is the 
condition of illness and not intent which 
defines the legalization of euthanasia, there 
will inevitably be cases of so-called 
involuntary euthanasia, in which patients 
have not stated their will to un- dergo 
euthanasia and cannot be asked about their 
wishes. When the objective circumstances 
“point to” euthanasia, it may be applied.  
The second is the objection to a person 
killing another even if the latter requests it. 
Professor Leon Kass has rightly addressed 
this matter in linking the debate to the social 
reasons for protecting human life, even 
against the pe- titioner’s will and even 
without questioning the altruistic motives of 
the euthanasia practitioner. One may think, 
for example, of a mother called upon to kill 
a child (Kass L, 2002). 
In the case of healthcare professionals, the 
men and women who would be 
professionally called upon to practice 
euthanasia within the context of a medical 
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“indication”, much has been said about the 
total transformation of medical ethics.   
Related to the foregoing, for example, is the 
argument of those who see in the 
legalization of euthanasia a total 
transformation of the value of dependency 
and of what Alasdair Ma- cIntyre has called 
the “virtues of acknowledged dependence” 
(MacIntryre A, 2001).  
The third is linked to the fact that when the 
possibility is created for compassionate 
killing to be one of the options available to a 
person in a situation of severe dependency, 
far from increasing freedom, the new 
possibility increases the potential pressure 
upon that person to forfeit care that was 
previously considered mandatory.  
I seek to present this objection by analy- 
sing the examples of moralized suicide; that 
is, the cases in which the social order 
favours someone taking their own life. In 
euthanasia, this masking becomes evident. 
One is obliged to construct a supporting 
argument based on the demands of care, on 
the burden that is placed upon others, on the 
selfishness of continuing to exist. Against 
this, what is moralized is doing what is 
useful for others, or falling into the 
temptation that afflicts us all.  
Parallelism cannot be taken very far, howe- 
ver, even when we recognize the social 
transcen- dence of suicide. Ultimately, we 
would almost all be ashamed to argue over 
suicide with a person who seeks or attempts 
it. This shame disappears when we are faced 
with the idea of a medical act consisting of 
one person replacing another’s act of suicide. 
Medically prescribed homicide is a legal 
problem of the first order.  
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